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Abstract. Insider threats are a significant security issue. The last decade has 
witnessed countless instances of data loss and exposure in which data has be-
come publicly available and easily accessible. Losing or disclosing sensitive da-
ta or confidential information may cause substantial financial and reputational 
damage to a company. Whilst more recent research has specifically focused on 
the insider misuse problem, it has tended to focus on the information itself – ei-
ther through its protection or approaches to detect leakage. In contrast, this pa-
per presents a proactive approach to the attribution of misuse via information 
leakage using biometrics and a locality-sensitive hashing scheme. The hash di-
gest of the object (e.g. a document) is mapped with the given biometric infor-
mation of the person who interacted with it and generates a digital imprint file 
that represents the correlation between the two parties. The proposed approach 
does not directly store or preserve any explicit biometric information nor docu-
ment copy in a repository. It is only the established correlation (imprint) is kept 
for the purpose of reconstructing the mapped information once an incident oc-
curred. Comprehensive experiments for the proposed approach have shown that 
it is highly possible to establish this correlation even when the original version 
has undergone significant file modification. In many scenarios, such as chang-
ing the file format r removing parts of the document, including words and sen-
tences, it was possible to extract and reconstruct the correlated biometric infor-
mation out of a modified document (e.g. 100 words were deleted) with an 
average success rate of 89.31%. 
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1 Introduction 
It is deeply worrying for organisations when data exposure originates from an author-
ised individual (e.g. an employee or contractor) who misuses their legitimate access, 
and the potential for adverse impacts, in this case, is typically higher than that of ac-
cess by outsiders [1–3]. Insiders are more likely to bypass security controls while 
outsiders, who typically have limited knowledge of internal infrastructure in a given 
case, pose a significantly smaller threat. Identifying such criminals, especially if the 
digital forensics process leads to the presentation of findings in legal proceedings, is a 
challenging and crucial task. Therefore, one of the aims of the digital forensics pro-
cess is to produce and test a hypothesis about who did what, where, when and how in 
relation to an incident under investigation. 
Existing methods and tools used by investigators to conduct examinations of digi-
tal crime significantly help in collecting, analysing and presenting digital evidence. 
Essential to this process is investigators establishing a link between the notable/stolen 
digital object and to the identity of the individual who used it; as opposed to merely 
using an electronic record or a log that indicates the user interacted with the object in 
question (evidence). This is a challenging task because it is currently difficult for 
digital forensic investigators to prove, to the appropriate standard in a court of law, 
that a specific human used a digital object (e.g. a document or image) at a particular 
time. An underlying assumption is that the identified computer account—as an 
example, of which the misuse occurred belongs to the individual who perpetrated the 
attack. However, with generally poor password use (e.g. shared or stolen accounts) 
and specific malicious intent, this is unlikely to be true. Thus, correlating such a link 
is key to identifying the individual(s) responsible. 
This paper presents an approach that transparently acquires biometric signals from 
individuals as they naturally interact with the system, and tries to correlate their bio-
metric information with the objects that they interact with, such as documents, email 
messages and photographs. In this manner, the biometric information of the last indi-
vidual to access a digital object will be linked to it. Subsequent misuse of such infor-
mation, through disclosure, for example, would enable an organisation to process the 
digital object, recover the biometric identifiers and identify the last employee who 
accessed it. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 highlights the related 
work in the area of action logs and watermarking. Section 3 introduces the proposed 
approach, including the core process. Section 4 presents the experimental analysis and 
evaluates the robustness of the proposed method. Section 5 discusses the findings and 
possible directions for future work, and section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
2 Related Work 
The current solution for detecting insider misuse involves a layering of security coun-
termeasures that includes comprehensive logging of servers (including authentication 
requests) so that logs can be correlated to understand who was using what machine at 
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what time, resulting in specific actions on the network [4–8]. Assuming encryption is 
in place, proxy-based network decryption and storage of network traffic is required to 
identify the misuse (possibly over prolonged periods of time). If third-party encryp-
tion is used, it can be challenging to decrypt and perform a deep inspection of the 
captured traffic [9–11]. 
A limited number of studies have tried to leverage soft biometric signals to detect 
malicious insiders’ activities [12, 13]. Both studies proposed systems that employ the 
use of human bio-signals such as electroencephalography and electrocardiogram to 
detect insiders' malicious activities. For detection, they measure the difference in bio-
signals deviations between normal and malicious activity phases. Although both sys-
tems deployed their approaches in real-life scenarios and achieved high detection 
accuracy, the experimental setup relies on users wearing a headset that continuously 
monitors bio-signals and a finger sensor to capture them. However, it is both unrealis-
tic and non-user-friendly to wear these sensors in real life continuously. 
Other researchers have employed steganography and watermarking techniques to 
embed specific data that could point to the action generator [14–17]. While the nature 
of conventional watermarking or steganography processes is not to modify the digital 
object in a manner that is noticeable, it does nonetheless modify the document. There 
may be situations where this modification is not desirable, for instance when preserv-
ing the integrity of the object is crucial. 
Therefore, the proposed approach in this study seeks to provide a mapping tech-
nique between the digital object and biometric identifiers, storing the mapped infor-
mation alongside document identifiers in a centralised storage repository. When the 
mapped (imprinted) objects are recovered or analysed, the information stored in the 
repository is used to recover the biometric information, which is subsequently used to 
identify the user. The key advantage of this approach is that the underlying digital 
object is not modified in any way, in contrast to the aforementioned watermarking 
studies. Also, no explicit biometric information is stored as only the correlation that 
points to locations within the imprinted object are preserved. 
3 The Proposed Approach 
The proposed approach takes advantage of Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) 
schemes to generate a less sensitive representation to modification of the document 
(text). In general, LSH algorithms are mainly used for dimensionality reduction by 
mapping high dimensional input space into lower dimensional space. A key differ-
ence between LSH based algorithms compared to cryptographic schemes is that the 
former is less sensitive to small changes on the mapped input space. In contrast to 
hash-based cryptographic schemes, which are designed for ensuring data integrity by 
maximising its sensitivity to the input space. Both methods map the input stream into 
a fixed output called digest (hash values). This study leverages LSH property of max-
imising the probability of a collision for similar inputs. This achieved by directly 
mapping the biometric feature vector representation of an individual with the comput-
ed LSH digest of a given document, this generates a digital—what is called ‘imprint’ 
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file. The resulted imprint file represents locations within the computed LSH hash 
value, each of which corresponds to a respective portion of the digital biometric fea-
ture vector. The user’s biometric samples from which the feature vector is computed 
(e.g. facial features, iris, keystroke analysis or behavioural profiling) are transparently 
and continuously captured – using suitable sensors – while the person is interacting 
with the computer. Finally, these generated imprints are stored in a centralised, secure 
database for later analysis when required. Fig. 1 illustrates the process of generating 
those imprint files which establish the correlation between the acquired biometric 
information of the corresponding person and the triggered document. Data leakage in 
the form of a document (whether posted on a public website or captured by the net-
work) can be then analysed by processing the imprint file with the given ‘leaked’ 
document, which was already imprinted at some point before it was leaked, to recon-
struct the mapped biometric feature vector. Once the sample is extracted, it can be 
processed by a biometric system in order to determine the last user who interacted 
with the object. 
To illustrate how mapping the biometric feature vector with LSH digest works, as-
sume that the following feature vector needs to be mapped with the given LSH digest 
as shown in Fig. 2.  
 
 Value 
Feature 
vector 
sample 
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
LSH 
digest 
sample 
      
[ F1751BD78C133A4A9303D6365E78E4933D843436A7921120789B58138AFB927BF7DE] 
Index 
         
      0………………10…………....20……….……30………….…40….………....50.……………60………… 
Fig. 2.  Examples of a feature vector and TLSH digest sample 
In this example, each value (digit) of the feature vector exists in more than one lo-
cation within the hash digest. The sample digest in this figure was computed using 
TLSH scheme which outputs 70 hexadecimal characters long (35 bytes). TLSH is a 
type of LSH schemes developed by TrendMicro [18]. In mapping, “0” is located in 
two locations; 18 and 47. In the same manner, the mapping process finds all matching 
locations for the remaining values of the given feature vector as shown in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 1. Biometric information-document correlation generation pipeline. 
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F.V. Matched index location within TLSH digest 
0 18 47  
1 1 4 10 44 45 54 
 2 43 46 61 
 3 11 12 17 19 22 31 32 36 38 55 
4 14 29 35 37 
 5 3 24 52 
 
6 21 23 39 
7 2 7 26 41 48 62 65 
 8 8 27 34 49 56 
 
9 16 30 42 50 60 
 1st 2nd 
  imprints 
Fig. 3. Feature vector—LSH digest mapping matrix 
By combining those mapped locations (one location from each row), this forms a 
single imprint. Hence, the total unique imprints that can be generated from the 
mapped indexes are two as highlighted in light green in Fig. 3. Therefore, using any 
of these imprints, it is possible to reconstruct the original (mapped) feature vector 
from the document by reversing the mapping process. The next subsection describes 
the correlation generation pipeline including the mapping process step. 
3.1 Correlation Generation Pipeline 
The generation process of the imprint file which associates individual’s biometric 
signal with a document of interest involves six main steps starting with acquiring 
document’s text and ending with generating the target imprint file. 
Extracting document text 
The document text is extracted from the file, and the text itself is processed, not the 
document file type. This approach makes it possible to imprint any document type so 
that its text can be extracted. For example, PDF, DOCX, TXT, HTML or even email 
messages can all be analysed, and their content can be parsed. Furthermore, the ex-
traction process eliminates any text formatting; therefore, the subsequent steps of the 
imprinting process rely purely on the text. 
Pre-processing the extracted text 
In this phase, all extra spaces between words, lines, paragraphs and pages that exist 
in the text are removed and replaced with a single space. This ensures that the com-
puted LSH digest is based only on the plain text, which means that if the document is 
maliciously manipulated later, for instance by adding extra spaces or page breaks, it 
will have low or even no effect on the computed hash value. 
6 
Fig. 4. Slicing document's text into 10-overlapped-folds. 
Computing the LSH value of the text 
The LSH value can be computed by using one of the known open-source algo-
rithms, including Ssdeep, Sdhash, Nilsimsa or TLSH [19–21, 18]. It is well estab-
lished that TLSH is more robust than the other schemes regarding the digest entropy, 
collision likelihood, as well as against manipulation attacks (e.g. removing, swapping, 
and inserting words) [22]. Therefore, the TLSH algorithm was chosen for use in this 
study to compute the hash digest of the extracted text. Also, two approaches can be 
used to compute the hash digest of the document as follows: 
a) Only a single hash digest is computed for the whole document, this makes the 
imprinting process much faster and stores fewer data in the database as only one 
digest is used to generate the correlation with the biometric signal. 
b) Hashing the text using a different resolution to produce multiple digests per doc-
ument, for example, per page, half page, and a paragraph or using k-overlapped-
folds of the examined document as illustrated in Fig. 4. It presents how document 
text is sliced into 10-overlapped-folds each of which is processed separately and 
its LSH value is computed. 
In this study, methods (a) and (b) are both examined and evaluated against differ-
ent possible attack vectors as detailed in Section 4. 
Also, another LSH hash digest is computed (using, for instance, Nilsimsa) and 
stored in a centralised database to be used later to locate the associated imprint file 
when a questioned document is queried. Besides, the biometric signal is hashed using 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) digest and stored as well. SHA is used for checking 
the integrity of extracted biometric signal. The reason for using another LSH algo-
rithm is to avoid storing the same LSH digest which was used for generating the im-
print. This ensures that having only the imprint in the database without the correlated 
document makes it impossible to reconstruct the related biometric information. 
Mapping feature vector with Hash digest value 
The feature vector and the LSH hash value of the text are mapped to its equivalent 
location in the text LSH hash value to retrieve the possible locations where they 
match as described previously in this section. 
Generating the imprints 
By retrieving the locations of each character of the feature vector with the object, it 
becomes possible to generate the imprints based on the obtained list of indexes, which 
means that multi-imprints of the whole feature vector can be generated by combining 
those positions. 
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3.2 Recovery algorithm 
The recovery algorithm to extract and reconstruct the imprinted biometric information 
out of a questioned document in the case of information leakage–shares the same 
steps 1-3 of the imprinting process that listed above. This followed by the following 
steps: 
a) The questioned document hash digest is computed (e.g. Nilsimsa) as input to the 
next step. 
b) The related-stored imprint file is retrieved by querying the centralised database–
using the computed hash digest–where previously generated fingerprints and im-
prints for all documents are stored. 
c) The retrieved imprint file is mapped with the computed LSH value of the docu-
ment in question, and the correlated biometric signal is reconstructed out of those 
mapped locations. 
d) To validate the integrity of the reconstructed biometric signal, its SHA digest is 
compared against the stored digest generated when the imprint was created. 
After explaining how the imprinting and retrieving techniques of the proposed ap-
proach work, the next section investigates the feasibility of imprinting biometric in-
formation with documents and later recovering them (even after the text is modified). 
4 Experimental Analysis 
The fundamental research question concerning the imprinting of the biometric signa-
ture is how robust the approach is, given subsequent modification of the document – 
arguably the key attack vector against this approach. An insider who intends to leak a 
confidential document could maliciously manipulate its content in order to destroy 
any tracks to avoid being traced. Therefore, to examine the feasibility and effective-
ness of the proposed approach, real leaked documents from WikiLeaks were chosen 
for experimental purposes. WikiLeaks is an international non-profit organisation that 
publishes secret information, news leaks and classified media provided by anonymous 
sources [23]. In 2009, it released more than six thousand reports commissioned by the 
United States Congress. These reports are classified as confidential documents and 
are now publicly available and accessible online in the form of text files [24]. Table 1 
provides statistical information about the used dataset. Leaking repositories such as 
WikiLeaks and The Intercept typically perform some kind of modifications to the 
leaked documents. For instance, they watermark uploaded documents and files with 
extra information such as document ID, date, website address or logo [25]. 
Table 1. Corpus statistics 
 
File size distribution(KB) #of docs Doc content Min Max Average 
1-99 4,920 Chars. 1,288 874,548 47,345 
100-199 853 Words 233 155,614 8,873 
200+ 227 Lines 38 16,160 981 
Total 6,000 Pages 1 622 34 
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A number of experiments were designed and conducted to evaluate the proposed 
approach in such scenarios that consider malicious intent with regard to any possible 
modification could be performed on the document. The first experiment maps the 
biometric feature vector with the computed text TLSH digest and retrieves it. The 
goal is to compute the possible number of imprints that can be generated from the 
mapping process. In addition, a total of twenty-one attacks were developed. This in-
cludes, file, formatting and text-based manipulation methods. These attacks critically 
examine the effectiveness of possible modification attacks on the imprinted docu-
ments and inspect how such attacks could affect the retrieval performance of the 
mapped biometric information. These developed attacks are classified into three main 
categories: file-type conversion, formatting change and content manipulations, as 
listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Possible document manipulation methods 
File-type conversion Formatting change Content manipulation 
1. PDF to .docx 
2. PDF to .txt 
3. PDF to Image 
4. Docx to PDF 
5. Docx to txt 
6. Txt to PDF 
7. Txt to .docx 
8. Txt to Image 
9. Font resizing 
10. Font type changing 
11. Colour changing 
12. Text highlighting 
13. Line and para spaces 
14. Deleting words 
15. Deleting sentences 
16. Deleting lines 
17. Swapping words 
18. Swapping sentences 
19. Swapping lines 
20. Substituting synonyms 
21. Inserting new words  
The used biometric feature vectors, in the imprinting process, represent real facial 
features. Fisherfaces feature extraction algorithm is used to compute these vectors for 
the captured users’ faces images [26]. The dimensions of the generated feature vector 
when using Fisherfaces algorithm is small compared to deep learning approaches as 
the length of the vector is a prime factor when performing imprinting process. The 
resulted vector is 4-dimensions with the length of 60 digits. The chosen vector in-
cludes frequency of all digits (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) as well as ‘-’ sign, this to en-
sure that this study covers all possible numbers within the mapping process. 
In all manipulation methods above, the original document TLSH value is computed 
before it is modified, and the resulting digest is then imprinted with the biometric 
information. After that, the manipulation methods are applied to the imprinted docu-
ments. Finally, the TLSH value of the modified version is computed again and com-
pared to the original one. As long as the original text has not changed, the full mapped 
biometric feature vector should be successfully retrieved by reversing the imprinting 
process. However, this is not always the case, since a leaked document is highly likely 
to have been manipulated or modified. Consequently, the computed hash value is 
directly affected, to what degree is depending upon the scale of modification. Fortu-
nately, TLSH is less sensitive to small changes than cryptographic hashing algo-
rithms, such as SHA, since a small modification in the input drastically changes the 
output computed digest. This is the so-called avalanche effect. 
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Fig. 5. Samples of computed document hash digests using SHA256 and TLSH 
In contrast, all similar digest schemes have the property that a small change to the 
file being hashed results in small change to the hash [18]. For example, Fig. 5 shows 
two samples of computed document hash digests using SHA256 and TLSH. Each 
presents two values: one for the original document and one for the modified version 
of the same document. It is clearly shown that the digest of the modified document 
computed bySHA256 is entirely different to the originals. While the TLSH digest is 
only slightly affected, the red characters are those changed while the others remain 
the same with exact locations. Therefore, the TLSH can be used in our approach to 
give a less sensitive representation for the whole document. 
Fig. 6 shows the averaged distribution of the number of imprints generated per 
document for the examined 6,000 documents in the dataset. The histogram indicates 
that most of the imprinted documents generated more than three imprints. The number 
of the obtainable imprints mainly depends on the generated TLSH digest entropy and 
digits frequency. The rate of the entropy and frequency differ from one document to 
another as this is natural property of hash schemes. Although multiple imprints per 
document were generated as the figure illustrates, in fact, only one imprint is needed 
to successfully reconstruct the biometric information. Indeed, having multiple im-
prints for a given document significantly increases the probability of recovering the 
mapped information even after the document is exposed to manipulation. 
 
Fig. 6. Distribution of the generated imprints per document. 
6efa3f05f084127249ebe7e0b37ffdda41db9ceacfbb65c04cd7de6a 
SHA256 digest of the original document 
49ca48a970f02c40cf85667d1708416ccca84de06d65467856aa3ef1 
SHA256 the digest of the modified document 
 
77F1866D9E10AF925F4228F3475961F8C0DAB4751388000565A1B8571D67C7E1F5A6FE1BE78C133A4A9303D6
365E7CE8933D843437A7D21120789B58238AFB927BF7DE 
TLSH digest of the original document 
 
4DF1856D4E106F925F4224F7476961F8C0DBB0751388001565A178571D67C7E0F1AAFF1BE78C133A0A9303D6
365E68E5A33D843437A7911520789B58238AFB927BF7EE 
TLSH digest of the modified document 
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Fig. 7. Distribution of change rate among dataset documents. 
The experimental results of the developed method indicate that the proposed approach 
is resistant and robust against both file-type conversion and formatting change attacks 
with an accuracy of 100%. Since the nature of these modification methods does not 
change the actual text or content which is fed into the LSH algorithm, therefore, the 
mapped biometric signal is fully retrievable even when the text format or file-type is 
changed, including converting the document into an image file type. However, in such 
a case, Optical Character Recognition (OCR) technologies could be used to analyse 
and convert the image content (printed text) into machine-encoded text. In this study, 
test documents were converted into images (JPEG) to simulate such an attack, and a 
Tesseract-OCR engine was used to read all those images and recognise and extract the 
embedded text [27]. As long as the OCR was able to recognise the correct text, which 
it did, the integrity of the text can be preserved compared to its original version. 
For the content manipulation attacks, random settings were configured for the rate 
of modification, as Fig. 7 illustrates, ranging from 1 to 100 for word-type attacks and 
1 to 20 for line and paragraph attacks. As this rate increases, the number of changes 
rises as well. For instance, in the case of the word-deleting attack, a number of ran-
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dom words between (1, 100) are deleted from each document in the dataset. Also, this 
applies to all other attacks that fit in the same category. 
Table 3 presents the results of retrieving the mapped feature vector under the con-
tent manipulation attack methods. In addition, TLSH uses a distance score of ‘0’, 
which indicates that the files are identical (or nearly identical), while scores above 
that represent a greater distance between the examined documents. A higher score 
should represent that there are more differences between the documents [18]. 
From the data in Table 3, it can be seen that given the capability of recovering bi-
ometric identifiers under significant levels of modification—such as deleting 100 
words—it is still possible to regenerate the established correlation between the bio-
metric information and the imprinted document with a success rate of (89.31%). In 
addition, Fig. 8 illustrates how the accuracy changes along with a defined number of 
deleted words. Two levels of hashing resolutions were applied on the examined doc-
uments, one hash digest per document and multi-hash digest using 10-overlapped-
folds per document. The overall accuracy is improved when multi-hash digests are 
generated. In general, a document is counted as correctly identified (feature vector is 
retrieved) if at least one imprint is perfectly extracted from the imprinted feature vec-
tor even when the computed hash digest is not identical to the one from which the 
original correlation where established.  
Table 3. Content manipulation attack methods experimental results. 
No Attack type 
Rate 
(number) 
#of retrieved F.V. 
Score 
(%) 
TLSH diff (origi-
nal/modified)1 
Min Max Avg. 
1  Del words 1-100 5,359 89.31 0 217 8 
2  Swap words 1-100 5,464 91.06 0 82 7 
3  Insert words 1-100 5,304 88.40 1 471 33 
4  Words syn. 1-100 5,751 95.85 1 465 30 
5  Del lines 1-10 2,708 45.13 7 466 43 
6  Swap lines 1-10 2,637 43.95 7 874 71 
7  Swap sentences 1-10 5,929 98.81 0 30 3 
8  Swap paras 1-10 2,853 47.55 5 125 26 
9  Del paras 1-10 2,767 46.11 5 149 26 
10  Del sentences 1-10 4,915 82.00 1 788 15 
11  Multi attacks2 1-10 3,828 64.00 1 456 31 
 
                                                          
1  TLSH diff is distance score between two digests (texts) 
2  A number of attack methods are randomly chosen 
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Fig. 8. Averaged accuracy and F1-Score for the deleted words attack. 
 
Fig. 9. Averaged accuracy and F1-Score for the deleted paragraphs attack. 
Furthermore, paragraph attacks (swap and delete methods) have scored low rates, 
with 47.55% and 46.11% respectively. Indeed, removing a number of paragraphs 
from the document significantly affects the computed hash digest to a greater degree 
than other types of modification, such as deleting words or sentences. This can be 
improved by changing the hashing resolution (i.e. using k-folds). For instance, instead 
of hashing the whole document and generating a single hash digest, multiple digests 
are computed for the document, for example per page, half page or paragraph, and 
correlating the biometric information with the resulted hashes. Fig. 9 shows the aver-
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aged accuracy and F1-score for the deleted paragraphs attack using 10-overlapped-
folds. The overall accuracy is higher than the single hash digest per document ap-
proach as it scored 93%. In contrast, the achieved F-score is not high as it computed 
for all the generated imprints, while only one valid retrieved imprint of a given docu-
ment is needed to reconstruct the mapped biometric information. Moreover, chances 
for recovering the correlated biometric signals vary based on the type and scale of 
attack vector. However, in many leakage cases, the leaked document might not be 
exposed to a severe modification. Hence, reconstructing the biometric sample is high-
ly likely to be possible and, as a result, the source of leakage can be identified. 
5 Discussion 
The most obvious finding to emerge from this study is that the underlying digital 
objects, documents in this case, are not modified in any form. In addition, the pro-
posed approach also disassociates any biometric information from the digital object 
itself, thereby minimising any attacks on the biometric data. Which means that the 
biometric single is not stored by any means in a database, only its correlation to the 
imprinted object (document/text in this case) is preserved in the imprint file. Thus, it 
becomes useless without having the imprinted document in presence for the recovery 
process, since the imprint file that correlates the object with the related biometric 
signal only contains those locations within the document where the signal can be 
extracted from. Besides, it allows for larger volumes of information to be imprinted, 
making it more suitable for digital objects when greater levels of information need to 
be correlated (i.e. multimodal biometric samples). It does, however, introduce the 
need for a centralised repository which will grow as users interact with objects and 
thus requires configuration and management. 
Although the above investigation has critically examined the proposed approach 
against possible malicious attacks and showed robustness and strength, a number of 
challenges exist and require further research. These include the ability to automate the 
process of capturing the biometric signal and detecting user interaction with the object 
instantly, along with establishing the correlation with the interacted object. This re-
quires the development of a smart and active agent that continually captures an indi-
vidual’s biometric information (using a camera in the case of facial information) and 
performs the imprinting process. Furthermore, the proposed approach raises important 
privacy concerns for those individuals who are monitored by the system. In which 
processing, transmitting and storing the biometric samples into a centralised database 
require a high level of confidentiality and sufficient resources. This obviously needs 
to be investigated in depth in the future work. More broadly, research is also needed 
to determine the ability to utilise a broader range of digital objects. Differing objects 
have varying degrees of stability due to their structure. For example, executable files 
and their underlying data structure can change considerably given small alterations to 
a file, in contrast to text. Therefore, the proposed approach needs to be examined for 
such file-types to fully measure its usefulness and robustness. Also, further study 
needs to be carried out regarding the ability to utilise soft biometric features such as 
the gender, age and even race of individuals to increase the discriminative ability and 
provide more reliable information to the investigator. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper has introduced a proactive approach to aiding an incident investigator to 
establish and examine a case of insider misuse, particularly with respect to infor-
mation leakage, and could increase the likelihood of the evidence being admissible in 
a court of law. This study has shown that it is possible to successfully recover 
biometric information even under significant modification attacks. Rather than requir-
ing the complete digital object, it is possible to recover the necessary information with 
even a modified version of the questioned document. 
7 Acknowledgements 
This research was undertaken with the support of the Majmaah University, Majmaah 
city, Saudi Arabia. 
References 
1. Titcomb, J., WikiLeaks releases thousands of hacked Macron campaign emails, 2017. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/31/wikileaks-releases-
thousands-hacked-macron-campaign-emails/. [Accessed: 07-Sep-2017]. 
2. WikiLeaks publishes ‘biggest ever leak of secret CIA documents,’ 2017. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/mar/07/wikileaks-publishes-biggest-
ever-leak-of-secret-cia-documents-hacking-surveillance. [Accessed: 09-Sep-2017]. 
3. Moshinsky, B., LEAKED DOCUMENT: Bank of England has ‘significant concern’ over 
post-Brexit approval for Deutsche Bank’s UK branch, 2017. [Online]. Available: 
http://uk.businessinsider.com/bank-of-england-document-deutsche-bank-post-brexit-uk-
2017-8. [Accessed: 07-Sep-2017]. 
4. Rahayu Selamat, S., S. Sahib, N. Hafeizah, R. Yusof, and M. Faizal Abdollah, A Forensic 
Traceability Index in Digital Forensic Investigation, J. Inf. Secur., vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 19–32, 
2013. 
5. Homem, I., S. Dosis, and O. Popov, LEIA: The Live Evidence Information Aggregator: 
Towards efficient cyber-law enforcement, in World Congress on Internet Security 
(WorldCIS-2013), 2013, pp. 156–161. 
6. Magklaras, G., S. Furnell, and M. Papadaki, LUARM – An Audit Engine for Insider 
Misuse Detection, Int. J. Digit. Crime Forensics, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 37–49, Jan. 2011. 
7. Homem, I., S. Dosis, and O. Popov, The Network Factor in Proactive Digital Evidence 
Acquisition, Int. J. Intell. Comput. Res., vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 517–526, 2015. 
8. Quick, D. and K.-K. R. Choo, Forensic collection of cloud storage data: Does the act of 
collection result in changes to the data or its metadata?, Digit. Investig., vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 
266–277, Oct. 2013. 
9. Pilli, E. S., R. C. Joshi, and R. Niyogi, Network forensic frameworks: Survey and research 
challenges, Digit. Investig., vol. 7, no. 1–2, pp. 14–27, Oct. 2010. 
10. Khan, S., A. Gani, A. W. A. Wahab, M. Shiraz, and I. Ahmad, Network forensics: Review, 
15 
taxonomy, and open challenges, J. Netw. Comput. Appl., vol. 66, pp. 214–235, May 2016. 
11. Birk, D. and C. Wegener, Technical Issues of Forensic Investigations in Cloud Computing 
Environments, in 2011 Sixth IEEE International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to 
Digital Forensic Engineering, 2011, pp. 1–10. 
12. Hashem, Y., H. Takabi, M. GhasemiGol, and R. Dantu, Towards Insider Threat Detection 
Using Psychophysiological Signals, in Proceedings of the 7th ACM CCS International 
Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats - MIST ’15, 2015, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 71–74. 
13. Almehmadi, A. and K. El-Khatib, On the Possibility of Insider Threat Detection Using 
Physiological Signal Monitoring, in Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on 
Security of Information and Networks - SIN ’14, 2014, pp. 223–230. 
14. Bouslimi, D. and G. Coatrieux, A crypto-watermarking system for ensuring reliability 
control and traceability of medical images, Signal Process. Image Commun., vol. 47, pp. 
160–169, Sep. 2016. 
15. Chaabane, F., M. Charfeddine, and C. Ben Amar, A survey on digital tracing traitors 
schemes, in 2013 9th International Conference on Information Assurance and Security 
(IAS), 2013, pp. 85–90. 
16. Macq, B., P. R. Alface, and M. Montanola, Applicability of watermarking for intellectual 
property rights protection in a 3D printing scenario, in Proceedings of the 20th 
International Conference on 3D Web Technology - Web3D ’15, 2015, pp. 89–95. 
17. Alruban, A., N. Clarke, F. Li, and S. Furnell, Insider Misuse Attribution using Biometrics, 
in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and 
Security - ARES ’17, 2017, pp. 1–7. 
18. Oliver, J., C. Cheng, and Y. Chen, TLSH -- A Locality Sensitive Hash, in 2013 Fourth 
Cybercrime and Trustworthy Computing Workshop, 2013, no. November 2013, pp. 7–13. 
19. Kornblum, J., Identifying almost identical files using context triggered piecewise hashing, 
Digit. Investig., vol. 3, no. SUPPL., pp. 91–97, Sep. 2006. 
20. Roussev, V., Data Fingerprinting with Similarity Digests, in IFIP Advances in Information 
and Communication Technology, vol. 337 AICT, 2010, pp. 207–226. 
21. Damiani, E., S. D. C. di Vimercati, S. Paraboschi, and P. Samarati, An Open Digest-based 
Technique for Spam Detection, Proc. 2004 Int. Work. Secur. Parallel Distrib. Syst., vol. 1, 
no. 1, pp. 559–564, 2004. 
22. Oliver, J., S. Forman, and C. Cheng, Using Randomization to Attack Similarity Digests, 
2014, pp. 199–210. 
23. WikiLeaks. [Online]. Available: https://wikileaks.org. [Accessed: 05-Sep-2017]. 
24. A billion in secret Congressional reports, 2009. [Online]. Available: 
https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Change_you_can_download:_a_billion_in_secret_Congressional
_reports. [Accessed: 04-Sep-2017]. 
25. The Intercept. [Online]. Available: https://theintercept.com/. [Accessed: 05-Sep-2017]. 
26. Belhumeur, P. N., J. P. Hespanha, and D. J. Kriegman, Eigenfaces vs. fisherfaces: 
Recognition using class specific linear projection, IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell., 
vol. 19, no. 7, pp. 711–720, 1997. 
27. Smith, R., An Overview of the Tesseract OCR Engine, in Ninth International Conference 
on Document Analysis and Recognition (ICDAR 2007) Vol 2, 2007, pp. 629–633. 
 
